---
title: "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior"
authors:
  - "John von Neumann"
  - "Oskar Morgenstern"
year: 1944
venue: "Princeton University Press"
arxiv: null
doi: "10.1515/9781400829460"
source: "https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691130613/theory-of-games-and-economic-behavior"
topics:
  - game-theory
  - utility
  - von-neumann
seed_rank: 551
seed_batch: "foundations-greats-2026-08-13"
reviewed: "2026-08-13"
pool: "game-ai"
relevance_score: 8
lineage: foundations-of-computing
cites:
  - title: "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele"
    url: "https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847"
    year: 1928
    arxiv: null
    doi: "10.1007/BF01448847"
see:
  - "550-zur-theorie-der-gesellschaftsspiele"
---

# Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

## One-sentence takeaway

Von Neumann and Morgenstern axiomatize expected utility and recast economic interaction as a mathematical theory of strategy, coalitions, and equilibrium payoffs.

## Why it matters here

GRID COMMAND and Broadside agents need explicit utilities and multi-agent payoffs; this is the source of the vNM preference calculus those objectives still sit on.

## Key ideas

- Preference axioms yield a utility unique up to positive affine transform, so expected payoff is the right scalar for mixed strategies.
- Zero-sum two-person games are solved by mixed-strategy equilibria; the 1928 minimax theorem is rebuilt as the core existence result.
- n-person games are reduced via coalitions and a characteristic function that assigns a value to every subset of players.
- Extensive form records sequential moves, information sets, and chance, then collapses to a normal-form payoff matrix.
- Imputation and stability notions (the original "solution") try to say which divisions of coalition value can persist.

## Caveats

## Links

- DOI: [10.1515/9781400829460](https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460)
- URL: https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691130613/theory-of-games-and-economic-behavior